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N E I L D I X O N 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of robbery, a 
felony of the second degree, in the Third District Court 
for the State of Utah. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The appellant, Neil Dixon, was convicted by a 
jury of the crime of robbery on February 26, 1974, in 
1 
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the Court of the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, and 
was sentenced to serve the indeterminate term provided 
by law in the Utah State Prison, namely one to fifteen 
years. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
guilt entered against him and a new trial in this matter. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On December 8, 1973, about midnight, Jack D. 
Patterson, on duty as a clerk at a Seven-Eleven groc-
ery store located at 4657 West and 5415 South in 
Kearns, was robbed. Mr. Patterson described the rob-
ber as black with a nylon stocking over his face to his 
nose, wearing a green field jacket and a blue stocking 
cap. In addition, he stated the robber had a "scraggly 
beard" and a .22 caliber pearl-handled revolver. The 
robber took something less than $20, then fled on foot. 
(T. 4-13) 
Deputy David Kelly, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, testified that he was observing traffic at the 
intersection of 35th South and Redwood Road ap-
proximately 12:25 a.m. when he observed a passenger 
in a vehicle who was black. He followed the vehicle 
for some blocks, then stopped it when other police 
vehicles arrived on the scene. The defendant, who was 
the passenger, and another black man were ordered out 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the vehicle at gunpoint. The officers took a blue 
stocking cap and a .22 caliber revolver from the vehicle. 
The defendant was wearing a green jacket. (T . 49-55) 
The defendant informed the police and testified 
at trial that he and the driver of the vehicle, his cousin 
Gary Scott, were searching for his sister-in-law's 
mother's house on the west side of town that evening, 
and that the pistol belonged to his grandmother and 
he intended to take it to her that evening. H e denied 
emphatically having been involved in a robbery. (T . 
99-114) 
The appellant's grandmother, Mrs. Olivia Scott, 
testified the pistol in fact belonged to her, and she had 
loaned it to her grandson, the appellant's brother, some 
months earlier. (T . 142-144) 
I n addition, the driver of the vehicle, Gary Scott, 
could not be found by either the appellant (T . 113-
114), or the State (T . 137-138), and the charges 
against Mr. Scott had been dismissed. (T . 67, 137) 
When placed on the stand at the outset of the de-
fendant's case, the victim, Jack D . Patterson, who had 
previously testified for the State, reiterated that he 
thought the robber was five feet four inches tall and 
distinctly smaller than himself. When asked to stand 
next to the appellant, he estimated the appellant's 
height at five feet ten inches, nearly equal to his. H e 
admitted the floor where he was standing was level 
with the floor where the robber was standing at the 
grocery store. (T . 97-98) Sgt. Bruce E g a n testified 
3 
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that the description of the robber dispatched over his 
radio was five feet four inches in height. (T. 44) 
Deputy David Kelly had previously testified that the 
stocking cap found in the appellant's car was not un-
usual and that the officer owned several caps like it 
himself. (T. 65) 
In addition, the green field jacket belonging to 
appellant, and introduced into evidence had a black 
collar and was not the standard army type field jacket. 
(T. 65) The victim, Mr. Patterson, did not recall see-
ing a black collar on the jacket of the robber. (T. 20) 
Finally, the revolver which belonged to appellant's 
grandmother and which was taken from appellant's car 
had a broken plastic grip which Mr. Patterson testified 
he did not notice on the pistol used by the robber. (T. 
22) The pistol was broken and could not have been 
fired when seized by the police. (T. 109). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
I T E M S OF P H Y S I C A L E V I D E N C E SEIZ-
E D BY T H E P O L I C E FROM T H E V E H I C L E 
I N W H I C H T H E A P P E L L A N T W A S R I D -
I N G W E R E T H E F R U I T S OF AN I L L E G A L 
A N D U N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L A R R E S T A N D 
S E A R C H , A N D T H E R E F O R E , S H O U L D 
H A V E B E E N S U P P R E S S E D BY T H E T R I A L 
COURT. 
4 
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I n the trial of this matter, three items of evidence: 
a blue stocking cap, (State's Exhibit No. 1) , a .22 
caliber revolver (State's Exhibit No. 2 ) , and a green 
army-type field jacket (State's Exhibit No. 3 ) , were 
introduced into evidence over the appellant's objection. 
(T . 145-6) 
Appellant argues that these three items, the cap, 
gun, and coat were the fruits of an illegal arrest and 
search and seizure and therefore, were violative of Utah 
law and the rights of the defendant under both the 
Utah and the United States' Constitutions. 
Appellant admits that the cap and coat belonged 
to him (T . 106, 107), and that he had control of the 
gun as he was returning it to his grandmother. (T . 
108, 109) H e , therefore, has the proper standing to 
object to their admissability against him at his trial. 
Kaufman v. U.S., 394 U .S . 217, 22 L . Ed . 2d 227, 
89 S. Ct. 1068 (1969). 
The thrust of appellant's argument is that the 
police officer in question, Deputy David Kelly of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, stopped the vehicle 
in which appellant was riding and examined it without 
probable cause to believe that the appellant, or the 
driver of the car, Gary Scott, had committed any viola-
tion of the laws of the State of Utah, traffic or penal. 
Appellant contends that Deputy Kelly, who was 
sitting at an intersection, and who had heard that a 
black was involved in a robbery, merely stopped the 
first car he saw with a black man in it. I n fact, Deputy 
Kelly admitted this at trial. (T . 59) 
5 
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No description of a vehicle was ever broadcast for 
there were no witnesses who testified that a vehicle was 
involved. Deputy Kelly admitted he was not watching 
for a vehicle, but a person. (T. 60) Deputy Kelly 
further testified that he had the following information: 
(a) a male black, 
(b) approximately five foot nine, 140 pounds, 
(c) wearing a dark green coat, 
(d) with a scraggley beard, 
(e) and a dark stocking cap, 
(f) had robbed a Seven-Eleven Store in Kearns 
a few moments prior. (T. 51) 
Sgt. Egan, Deputy Kelly's supervisor, differed 
with Deputy Kelly and had previously testified that 
the broadcast description of the robber was five foot 
four inches tall, (T. 35) which was the description 
given by the victim, Mr. Patterson, to the police. (T. 
24) In addition, Sgt. Egan, in describing the broad-
cast, omitted the "scraggly beard" aspect of the de-
scription. (T. 35) 
Deputy Kelly testified that while sitting at the 
intersection of Redwood Road and 35th South, he ob-
served a vehicle with two blacks pull up to the red 
light there. He testified that he noticed the passenger 
was a male black with a scraggly beard and a green 
coat on, from twenty to twenty-five feet away. He ad-
mitted the suspect was not wearing a stocking cap. (T. 
58) He also omitted any statement as to observation 
6 
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of a traffic violation by the driver of the vehicle. In 
fact, he testified the passenger's features were the only 
reason he followed the vehicle. (T. 52) 
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) 
requires that police officers have ". . . reasonable be-
lief that (a) vehicle is being operated in violation of 
any provision of this act (Motor Vehicle Act) or of 
any other law regulating the operation of vehicles . . . " 
before they may stop a vehicle and make inquiry of the 
driver. Such a law prevents a police officer from stop-
ping any vehicle he desires upon whim, caprice or 
"hunch", and therefore unreasonably disturbing the per-
sonal privacy of the driver and occupants of such 
vehicle. 
In the case at bar, Deputy Kelly admits by infer-
ence (T. 52), and by omission that the driver of the 
vehicle was not stopped because Deputy Kelly had "rea-
sonable belief" that a provision of the Motor Vehicle 
Act was being violated. His justification for stopping 
the vehicle, therefore, becomes a question of whether 
or not he had probable cause to believe that the pass-
enger in that vehicle, appellant Neil Dixon, had vio-
lated the law. If he did not have probable cause to 
stop the vehicle, the items taken from the vehicle are 
inadmissable on the grounds that they were the fruits 
of an illegal arrest and search, and or the fruits of an 
illegal stop of a motor vehicle under Section 41-1-17, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953). 
We, therefore, turn to the issue of probable cause 
for arrest and search without a warrant, and explore 
7 
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the case law defining what constitutes probable cause 
for belief of violation of a crime on the part of a police 
officer. 
The first authoritative pronouncement on prob-
able cause concerned arrests and searches without a 
warrant. In Wrightson v. U.S., 222 F . 2d 556 (1955), 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed a robbery conviction for the reason 
that the arrest in the case, made without a warrant, was 
made without "probable cause", and, therefore, all items 
seized as a result of such arrest should have been ex-
cluded by the trial court. The Court there held that: 
"An officer must show 'probable cause' to get a 
warrant from a magistrate, and he must have 
'probable cause" to make an arrest without a 
warrant. . . We are here at the very heart of due 
process of law and, more directly, at the essence 
of the Fourth Amendment." 222 F . 2d at 558. 
In the instant case, items were seized from the car 
in which appellant was riding after he was ordered 
from the car at gunpoint. (T. 62) Appellant con-
tends that those items were the fruits of an unlawful 
arrest and search because the stopping of the car and 
the subsequent requirement that the appellant and Mr. 
Scott exit the vehicle at gunpoint constituted an arrest. 
The fact that the words "you're under arrest" were not 
pronounced prior to the officer's search of the vehicle 
is immaterial. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968), the United 
States Supreme Court held that a search incident to a 
lawful arrest may not precede the arrest and serve as 
8 
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par t of its justification. The legality of the search 
therefore depends upon the legality of the arrest. Chim-
el v. California, 395 U . S . 752, 23 L . E d 2d 685, 89 S. 
Ct. 2034 (1969). 
I t therefore follows that in order for an arrest to 
be legal and constitutional, it must be made with a war-
rant or with the same probable cause required for a 
warrant. The reasoning of Justice Jackson, writing 
for the majority of the U. S. Supreme Cou t in United 
States v. Di Re, 332 U . S . 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L . E d . 
210 (1948) would seem to apply to the arrest and 
search in the instant case: 
" W e have had frequent occasion to point out 
that a search is not to be made legal by what it 
turns up. I n law it is good or bad when it starts 
and does not change character from its success." 
332 U . S . at 595. 
The reasoning of Justice Jackson was buttressed 
by the Wrightson court, supra, when it said: 
"The requirement of 'probable cause' for action 
without a warrant is surely no less exacting than 
is the necessity for 'probable cause' for the issu-
ance of a warrant. But, if officers can arrest 
without a warrant and never be required to dis-
close the facts upon which they based their belief 
of probable cause — if in other words, they have 
an untouchable power to arrest without a war-
rant — why should they ever bother to get a 
warrant?" 222 F . 2d at 559. 
W e now come to the question of whether or not 
the concept of "fitting the general description" con-
9 
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stitutes probable cause for a police officer to stop a 
vehicle, search it and arrest the occupants. I t is clear 
that in the instant case Deputy Kelly relied totally 
on the fact that the appellant fit the general descrip-
tion of a robbery suspect to stop the vehicle, search it, 
and arrest the appellant. (T. 51) 
In Brown v. Teras, 481 S.W. 2d 106 (1972), the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that where 
a police officer had no specific knowledge connecting 
any of the defendants whom he observed in an auto-
mobile with an armed robbery he was aware of, and 
where the description of the robbers contained no iden-
tifiable characteristics which would distinguish them 
from the general population, the officer lacked prob-
able cause to arrest the defendants without a warrant 
for robbery and items found in the warrantless search 
of the automobile were inadmissable. The description 
of the three holdup men consisted only of a designation 
as to race and an approximation as to height and weight. 
The Court there said: 
"Probable cause for an arrest exists where, at 
that moment, the facts and circumstances within 
the knowledge of the arresting officer and of 
which he has reasonable trustworthy information, 
would warrant a reasonable and prudent man in 
believing that a particular person has committed, 
or is committing a crime. . . The inarticulate 
hunch, suspicion or good faith of an arresting 
officer is insufficient to constitute probable 
cause. . ." (emphasis supplied) 481 S.W. 2d at 
110. 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court went on to point out that the general 
description of the robbers that the officer had been 
given could have done no more than raise the officer's 
suspicion that the three men in the car were robbers. 
That suspicion alone, the Court said, did not constitute 
probable cause to stop the car, search it, and arrest the 
occupants. 481 S.W. 2d 112. 
The police officer in the instant case, as in Brown, 
had no specific information linking appellant to the 
robbery. In fact, as was the case in Brown, Deputy 
Kelly had no reason to believe the robber of the Kearns 
store was in a vehicle and he was not looking for a 
specific vehicle. (T. 60) Lacking specific information 
linking the appellant to the Seven-Eleven robbery, the 
officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for that 
crime or to search the vehicle in which he was riding. 
Whitely v. Warden ^Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 
560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971). Further, 
in Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S. Ct. 
280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1923) and Henry v. United States, 
361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1969), 
the United States Supreme Court, while holding that 
the fact that suspects are in a car is a factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether exigent circumstances 
existed which precluded obtaining a warrant, also held 
that such a fact did not dispense with the need for 
probable cause." Henry, supra. 
Finally, the most persuasive case to be considered 
by this Court should be Gatlin v. U.S., 326 F . 2d 266 
(1963) in which the United States Court of Appeals 
U 
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for the District of Columbia reversed the robbery con-
viction of a black man because he was arrested without 
probable cause. This case should be particularly per-
suasive to this Court because its facts seem to square 
"on all fours" with the facts of the instant case. In 
Gatlin, the Court said: 
"Gatlin's arrest was without probable cause. I t 
was an arrest for investigation. The only evid-
ence on which arrest was predicated was the fact 
that there was a robbery, that one of the robbers 
was a Negro wearing a trench coat, that a Negro 
man fled from a taxi, and that Gatlin, a Negro 
man, was observed walking down the street a 
mile and a half from the robbery wearing a 
trench coat. This is not the type of evidence 
which justifies deprivation of liberty. (Emphasis 
added) 326 F . 2d at 670-1. 
In the instant case, it will be recalled that the 
knowledge of Deputy Kelly at the time he spotted ap-
pellant was that a robbery had occurred; that the 
robber was a black man approximately five feet nine 
inches tall and weighing 140 pounds; that he was wear-
ing a green coat and dark stocking cap; and (assuming 
arguendo, he was correct) the robber had a scraggly 
beard. (T. 51) Deputy Kelly observed the appellant, 
a black man with a scraggly beard wearing a green 
coat. The facts are essentially identical to the Gatlin 
case in which all evidence seized, i.e. a toy gun and 
$50 in cash, was held to be inadmissible because the 
police officer had no probable cause for arrest. The 
only significant factual difference in the two cases is 
that, in Gatlin the suspect was on foot, and in the in-
12 
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stant case, the suspect was a passenger in a vehicle. 
That fact itself would seem to strengthen appellant's 
argument in that the officer had no reason to believe 
the robber would be in a vehicle. (T. 60) 
In conclusion, it would seem appropriate to sum 
up by once again quoting from Mr. Justice Jackson's 
majority opinion in United States v. Di Re, supra: 
"We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to 
necessity. I t is said that if such arrests and 
searches cannot be made, law enforcement will 
be more difficult and uncertain. But the fore-
fathers, after consulting the lessons of history, 
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in 
the way of a too permeating police surveillance, 
which they seemed to think was a greater danger 
to a free people than the escape of some crimin-
als from punishment. Taking the law as it has 
been given to us, this arrest and search were be-
yond the lawful authority of those who executed 
them. The conviction based on evidence so ob-
tained cannot stand." 332 U.S. at 595. 
Appellant asks this Court to reverse his conviction 
and remand the case for a new trial, with an order 
suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of the un-
lawful arrest of defendant and search of the vehicle in 
which he was a passenger. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E A D M I S S I O N O F A P O L I C E P H O T O -
G R A P H OF A P P E L L A N T AT T R I A L W A S 
NON-PROBATIVE A N D SO P R E J U D I C I A L 
AS TO D E N Y A P P E L L A N T A F A I R T R I A L . 
13 
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The State's attorney in this matter elicited testi-
mony from Roger F . Taylor of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office concerning eight photographs shown 
to the witness, Mr. Patterson, three days after the 
robbery occurred. (T. 71-74) Appellant's attorney ob-
jected to testimony concerning these items and the ob-
jection was overruled by the Court. (T. 73-4) 
Exhibit No. 8, a photograph of appellant, was 
procured by the officer the day following the robbery, 
and Officer Taylor testified further that Exhibit No. 
8 was a police photograph taken the night appellant 
was arrested in this matter. (T. 72) The other photo-
graphs, Exhibit Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were not 
admitted into evidence due to appellants objection, but 
Exhibit No. 8, the photograph of appellant, was ad-
mitted over appellant's objection. (T. 95-6) This 
objection was later renewed as the basis for a motion 
for mistrial which the Court also denied. (T. 148-9) 
Appellant assigns the admission of Exhibit No. 8 into 
evidence and the subsequent denial of a mistrial on that 
basis as error in this appeal. 
This Court, in observing Exhibit No. 8, will note 
that it is a particularly bad picture. The hair is un-
kempt, the dress of the appellant in unkempt. One 
might say the photograph gives the appellant the look 
of a criminal, when in court appellant appeared alto-
gether different. Below appellant's photograph are 
numbers and the words "SALT L A K E COUNTY 
S H E R I F F ' S O F F I C E . " The photograph is actually 
two pictures, a side view and a front view. Such a 
14 
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photograph of any innocent person may make that 
person look like a criminal. 
The crux of appellant's objection revolves around 
the probative value of such a photograph. Perhaps if 
all eight photographs were admitted into evidence for 
the jury 's consideration, they would be relevant to show 
that the witness picked appellant's picture from a num-
ber of pictures of people who looked like him. The 
State's attorney seemed to offer them into evidence for 
this purpose. Oddly enough, the Court excluded all 
photographs except that of the appellant. H a d ap-
pellant's attorney attempted to introduce a picture of 
appelant as a choir boy in church, such an offer would 
undoubtedly have been denied as non-probative. W h a t 
probative value then, is involved in a police photograph 
of the appellant which is such a bad likeness, he ap-
pears to resemble the average person's concept of a 
criminal? 
Appellant believes that the admission of State's 
Exhibit No. 8 was so prejudicial as to have denied 
him a fair trial and asks that the judgment of the 
lower court be reversed and the matter remanded for a 
new trial. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E S T A T E M E N T O F T H E T R I A L 
J U D G E D U R I N G A P P E L L A N T ' S C L O S I N G 
A R G U M E N T G A V E T H E I M P R E S S I O N 
T H A T T H E T R I A L J U D G E D I D N O T B E -
15 
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L I E V E A P P E L L A N T S T E S T I M O N Y CON-
C E R N I N G AN A L I B I W I T N E S S , A N D 
T H E R E F O R E P R E J U D I C E D T H E J U R Y 
A N D D E N I E D A P P E L L A N T H I S R I G H T TO 
A F A I R T R I A L . 
Enclosed in the Record of the case before the court 
is a handwritten statement by the Honorable Joseph 
G. Jeppson. (R. 33) In the statement Judge Jeppson 
states that: 
"Mr. Keller (defense attorney) in substance 
argues that the witness Scott could not be found 
anywhere. They had looked all over for him. 
Mr. Bullen (State's attorney) interrupted him 
and objected that the evidence did not show such 
a search. 
I sustained the objection and said the evidence 
did not show that anyone had looked very hard 
for him. 
I have written this within an hour after the ver-
dict so I can recall it if asked later. I doubt 
that the reporter recorded it. She was not re-
porting the argument and says she can't take the 
part of the argument after it was given and 
while an objection is being made." (R. 33) 
A reading of the transcript of trial shows that, 
in fact, the closing arguments, and therefore the 
Judge's statements, were not recorded. 
Appellant argues that the Judge could have sus-
tained the prosecutor's objection without comment, 
however, the comment, " . . . the evidence did not show 
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that anyone looked very hard for him. . .", was highly 
prejudicial to appellant since it tended to indicate, by 
its very nature, that the Judge did not believe the wit-
ness would provide an alibi for appellant. Although 
the State may argue that such a statement was not 
prejudicial since the Court instructed the jury that it 
did not intend to express an opinion on the evidence 
during the course of the trial, (R. 26), it will be noted 
that the Court instructed the jury prior to closing 
argument, and such a statement by a judge cannot help 
but influence a jury who looks to the judge during the 
entire trial for judgment and guidance as to its duty. 
The witness in question, Gary Scott, was driving 
the vehicle in which appellant was riding when it was 
stopped on Redwood Road by Deputy Kelly. (T. 63) 
Appellant testified that he had been with Scott for 
several hours, including the time the robbery occurred. 
(T. 100-5) Mr. Scott is the only person who could have 
supported defendant's statements that he did not com-
mit the robbery. However, the charges were dropped 
against Mr. Scott, (T. 67) and Mr. Dixon was sub-
sequently unable to locate him despite his efforts to 
do so. (T. 113-4) 
The defense even went so far as to call Herschel 
Bullen, the State's attorney, to the stand. Mr. Bullen 
testified that the State had attempted to subpoena Mr. 
Scott, but that the subpoena was returned unserved. 
(T. 137-8) 
Counsel for appellant moved for mistrial on the 
basis of the Court's comment, but the motion was 
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denied. (T. 149) Appellant cites this fact as his third 
assignment of error in this case. 
I t goes without necessity for documentation that 
a fair trial is the most fundamental requirement of 
Due Process of Law; and "a fair trial means a trial 
before an impartial judge and an honest jury in an 
atmosphere of judicial calm." 21 AM. Jr . 2d § 235. 
When a trial judge loses his impartiality, he jeop-
ordizes a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Gudger v. U.S., (App D.C.) 314 F . 2d 268 (1960). 
Recognizing this fact, the American Bar Association's 
Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 15, states in part: 
". . . (The Judge) should avoid interruptions of 
counsel in their arguments except to clarify his 
mind as to their positions, and he should not be 
tempted to the unnecessary display of learning 
or a premature judgment." 
The language of this Court has always upheld the 
proposition that a trial judge or prosecutor should re-
frain from doing or saying anything that might preju-
dice a defendant's right to a fair trial in a criminal 
case. In State v. Jameson, 103 Utah 129, 134 P . 2d 
173 (1943), the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
"Both the court and the prosecutors should be 
zealous in protecting the rights of an accused, 
and should carefully refrain from doing or say-
ing anything from which it might be inferred 
that an unfair advantage was taken of a de-
fendant." 134 P. 2d at 175-176. 
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In State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P. 2d 724 
(1946), the Utah Supreme Court stated emphatically: 
"The Court's remark, if construed by the jury as 
indicated, would constitute a comment on the 
evidence. In this jurisdiction, such comment is 
not within the province of the Court." 175 P . 2d 
at 738. 
In that case the Court discussed the probable prejudic-
ial effect of a trial judge's comment during the trial, 
and although the Court did not reverse on that basis, 
it clearly indicated such comment was error. 
". . . And if so understood by the jury, the re-
mark could not be characterized as non-preju-
dicial. Characterizing as 'nefarious' a publica-
tion written by a defendant and used by other 
defendants in what they contended was propa-
gation of religious views, could not but convey 
to the minds of the jurors the impression that 
the court thought that the writer of the book 
and the propagators of the views therein ex-
pressed are iniquitous." 175 P. 2d at 738. 
The most persuasive and authoritative pronounce-
ment of this Court, with respect to a trial judge's com-
ments is found in State v. Rosenbaum, 22 Utah 2d 159, 
449 P . 2d 999 (1969). In that case, this Court re-
versed the burglary conviction of a criminal defendant 
on the ground that the trial judge's comment to the 
jury regarding the weight to be given to defendant's 
alibi constituted prejudicial error. The comment was 
in the form of a cautionary instruction. The Court 
held: 
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"We think that in this case it was prejudicial 
error for the court to indicate to the jury that 
they should apply a different standard for de-
termining the weight of evidence regarding alibi 
from that which they were to apply to any other 
evidence in the case." 449 P . 2d at 1002. 
Directly in point with the instant case, Justice 
Ellet began his majority opinion by declaring: 
"In this state the trial judge is not permitted to 
comment on evidence and he, therefore, may not 
indicate to a jury that evidence is either weak 
or convincing. It is the sole and exclusive prov-
ince of the jury to determine the facts in a crim-
inal case, and this it must do regardless of the 
relative strength or weakness of the evidence in 
the case, (emphasis added) 449 P . 2d at 1000. 
I t seems clear then, that in the State of Utah, where 
a trial judge is not allowed to comment on the evid-
ence, any such comment constitutes error. And, as 
Justice EUett observed in Rosenbaum, such comment 
indicating strength or weakness of evidence is prejudi-
cial error. 
In the instant case, the trial judge commented on 
the evidence when he stated that: 
". . . the evidence did not show that anyone 
looked very hard for him (alibi witness) . . ." 
(R. 33) 
In determining the possible prejudicial effect of such 
statement, this Court must consider that the comment 
was made immediately after the judge had sustained the 
State's attorney's objection to the defense attorney's 
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argument on the evidence during closing argument, and 
after the jury had been instructed by the court. Since 
it was the appellant who was to have relied on the wit-
nesses testimony as part of his alibi defense, the logical 
inference and conclusion to be drawn by the jury was 
that the judge believed that the appellant didn't try 
very hard to find the witness and so was lying when he 
testified that the witness could provide him with an 
alibi. (T. 113) 
Appellant asks this Court to consider the weight 
of authority presented in prior Utah Supreme Court 
decisions and grant him a new trial as it did for appel-
lant Rosenbaum, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the three assignments of error here-
tofore presented, appellant urges this Court to reverse 
the judgment of the trial court and grant him a new 
trial in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L A R R Y R. K E L L E R 
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